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Abstract
Current neural-network-based classifiers are susceptible to adversarial examples.
The most empirically successful approach to defending against such adversarial
examples is adversarial training, which incorporates a strong self-attack during
training to enhance its robustness. This approach, however, is computationally
expensive and hence is hard to scale up. A recent work, called fast adversarial
training, has shown that it is possible to markedly reduce computation time without
sacrificing significant performance. This approach incorporates simple self-attacks,
yet it can only run for a limited number of training epochs, resulting in sub-optimal
performance. In this paper, we conduct experiments to understand the behavior of
fast adversarial training and show the key to its success is the ability to recover
from overfitting to weak attacks. We then extend our findings to improve fast
adversarial training, demonstrating superior robust accuracy to strong adversarial
training, with much-reduced training time.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples are carefully crafted versions of the original data that successfully mislead a
classifier [1], while realizing minimal change in appearance when viewed by most humans. Although
deep neural networks have achieved impressive success on a variety of challenging machine learning
tasks, the existence of such adversarial examples has hindered the application of deep neural networks
and drawn great attention in the deep-learning community.
Empirically, the most successful defense thus far is based on Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
adversarial training [2, 3], augmenting the data of interest with strong adversarial examples, to help
improve model robustness. Although effective, this approach is not efficient and may take multiple
days to train a moderately large model. On the other hand, one of the early versions of adversarial
training, based on a weaker Fast Gradient Signed Method (FGSM) attack, is much more efficient
but suffers from “catastrophic overfitting,” a phenomenon where the robust accuracy with respect to
strong attacks suddenly drops to almost zero during training [4, 5], and fails to provide robustness
against strong attacks.
Fast adversarial training [5] is a simple modification to FGSM, that mitigates this issue. By initializing
FGSM attacks with large randomized perturbations, it can efficiently obtain robust models against
strong attacks. Although the modification is simple, the underlying reason for its success remains
unclear. Moreover, fast adversarial training is only compatible with a cyclic learning rate schedule
[6], with a limited number of training epochs, resulting in sub-optimal robust accuracy compared to
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PGD adversarial training [7]. When fast adversarial training runs for a large number of epochs, it
still suffers from catastrophic overfitting, similar to vanilla FGSM adversarial training. Therefore, it
remains an unfinished task to obtain the effectiveness of PGD adversarial training and the efficiency
of FGSM adversarial training simultaneously.
In this paper, we conduct experiments to show that the key to the success of fast adversarial training
is not avoiding catastrophic overfitting, but being able to retain the robustness of the model when
catastrophic overfitting occurs. We then utilize this understanding to propose a simple fix to fast
adversarial training, making possible the training of it for a large number of epochs, without sacrificing
efficiency. We demonstrate that, as a result, we yield improved performance.
We also revisit a previously developed technique, FGSM adversarial training as a warmup [8],
and combine it with our training strategy to further improve performance with small additional
computational overhead. The resulting method obtains better performance compared to the state-of-
the-art approach, PGD adversarial training [7], while consuming much less training time.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We conduct experiments to explain both the success and the failure of fast adversarial
training for various cases.
• We propose an alternative training strategy as a fix to fast adversarial training, which is
equivalently efficient but allows training for a large number of epochs, and hence achieves
better performance.
• We propose to utilize the improved fast adversarial training as a warmup PGD adversarial
training, to outperform the state-of-the-art adversarial robustness, with reduced training
time.
2 Background and Related Work
The existence of adversarial examples was initially reported in [1]. Since then, many approaches
have been proposed to mitigate this issue and improve the adversarial robustness of models. A
straightforward method is data augmentation, where adversarial examples are generated before the
back-propagation at each iteration and used for model updates. This approach is referred to as
adversarial training. It was first used with a gradient-based single-step adversarial attack, also known
as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [2]. Later, [9] found that models trained with FGSM
tend to overfit and remain vulnerable to stronger attacks. They proposed a multi-step version of
FGSM, namely the Basic Iterative Method (BIM), seeking to address its weaknesses. Randomized
initialization for FGSM then was introduced in [4], leading to R+FGSM to increase the diversity
of attacks and mitigate the overfitting issue. Finally, [3] combined randomized initialization with
multi-step attacks to propose projected gradient descent (PGD) attacks, and showed its corresponding
adversarial training is able to provide strong adversarial robustness [10]. As PGD adversarial training
is effective, many works have tried to improve upon it [11, 12]. However, a recent study [7] conducted
extensive experiments on adversarially trained models and demonstrated that the performance gain
from almost all recently proposed algorithmic modifications to PGD adversarial training is no better
than a simple piecewise learning rate schedule and early stopping to prevent overfitting.
In addition to adversarial training, a great number of adversarial defenses have been proposed, yet
most remain vulnerable to stronger attacks [2, 13, 14, 9, 15, 16, 10]. A major drawback of many
defensive models is that they are heuristic and vulnerable to adaptive attacks that are specifically
designed for breaking them [17, 18]. To address this concern, many works have focused on providing
provable/certified robustness of deep neural networks [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29], yet
their certifiable robustness cannot match the empirical robustness obtained by adversarial training.
Among all adversarial defenses that claim empirical adversarial robustness, PGD adversarial training
has stood the test of time. The only major caveat to PGD adversarial training is its computational cost,
due to the iterative attacks at each training step. Many recent works try to reduce the computational
overhead of PGD adversarial training. [30] proposes to update adversarial perturbations and model
parameters simultaneously. By performing multiple updates on the same batch, it is possible to
imitate PGD adversarial training with accelerated training speed. Redundant calculations are removed
in [31] during back-propagation for constructing adversarial examples, to reduce computational
overhead. Recently, [5] shows surprising results that FGSM adversarial training can obtain strongly
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robust models if a large randomized initialization is used for FGSM attacks. However, they are forced
to use a cyclic learning rate schedule [32] and a small number of epochs for the training. This issue
limits its performance, especially when compared to state-of-the-art PGD adversarial training with
early stopping [7].
3 Fast Adversarial Training
3.1 Preliminaries
We consider the task of classification over samples (x, y) ∈ (X ,Y). Consider a classifier fθ : X → Y
parameterized by θ, and a loss function L. For a natural example x ∈ X , an adversarial example x′
satisfies D(x, x′) <  for a small  > 0, and fθ(x) 6= fθ(x′), where D(·, ·) is some distance metric,
i.e., x′ is close to x but yields a different classification result. The distance is often described in terms
of an `p metric, and we focus on the `∞ metric in this paper.
Adversarial training is an approach for training a robust model against adversarial attacks. It represents
the objective of obtaining adversarial robustness in terms of a robust optimization problem, defined
as
min
θ
E(x,y)∼X max‖x′−x‖∞<
(L(fθ(x′), y)) (1)
It approximates the inner maximization by constructing adversarial examples based on natural
examples, and then the model parameters θ are updated via an optimization method with respect
to the adversarial examples, instead of the natural ones. One of the simplest choices of attack for
adversarial training is the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [2]:
x′ = x+ sign(∇xL(fθ(x), y)) (2)
Before the introduction of fast adversarial training [5], which we will introduce later, it was commonly
believed that FGSM adversarial training fails to provide strong robustness [9]. During FGSM
adversarial training, the robust accuracy of the model would suddenly drop to almost 0% after a
certain point, when evaluated against PGD attacks. This phenomenon was referred to as “catastrophic
overfitting” in [5]. The cause of catastrophic overfitting was studied extensively in [4]: during
training, since FGSM is a simple attack, the model learns to fool the FGSM attacks by inducing
gradient masking/obfuscated gradient [10]; that is, the gradient is no longer a useful direction for
constructing adversarial examples. The existence of catastrophic overfitting has prohibited the use of
FGSM adversarial training.
To mitigate this issue, [3] introduced a multi-step variant of FGSM, namely Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD), which takes multiple small steps with stepsize α to construct adversarial examples
instead of one large step as in FGSM:
x′t+1 = Π‖x′−x‖∞≤
(
x′t + αsign(∇x′tL(fθ(x′t), y))
)
(3)
Extensive experimental results [3, 10] have shown that, unless the model is particularly designed for
creating obfuscated gradients [18], PGD attacks are generally exempt from overfitting. Consequently,
adversarial training with PGD leads to robust models against strong attacks, although its computational
cost is often an order of magnitude more expensive than standard training and FGSM adversarial
training.
Recently, in contrast to conventional believe, [5] proposed fast adversarial training and suggested
it is possible to construct strongly robust models via FGSM adversarial training. They showed it
is important to initialize a FGSM attack with large randomized perturbations, to protect FGSM
adversarial training from overfitting. Although randomly initialized FGSM (R+FGSM) has been used
in previous works [4], [5] points out that the scale of the randomized initialization was restrictive and
needs to be enlarged. As a result, this simple modification enables R+FGSM adversarial training to
obtain reasonable robustness against strong attacks.
3.2 Sub-optimal Performance of Fast Adversarial Training
In [5] it is claimed that fast adversarial training has comparable performance as PGD adversarial
training, yet they only compared to the original results from [3]. Recent work [7] has shown PGD
3
30 40 50 60
Number of epochs
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Te
st
 A
cc
ur
ac
y(
%
)
Clean(Piecewise)
Robust(Piecewise)
Clean(Cyclic)
Robust(Cyclic)
Clean(PGD)
Robust(PGD)
Figure 1: The epoch number where
overfitting happens for FastAdv with
the piecewise learning rate schedule,
virsus the best clean (orange) and ro-
bust (green) accuracy before overfit-
ting. The solid lines and dashed lines
are the clean and robust accuracy for
FastAdv with cyclic learning rates and
PGD adversarial training with piece-
wise learning rates.
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Figure 2: Comparison of a success mode (orange) and a
failure mode (green) of fast adversarial training for 30 epochs.
In plot (a), we show the test clean and robust accuracy for
each epoch. In plot (b), we report the same quantities for
every 10 batches for the last 5 epochs. Both models encounter
catastrophic overfitting, but only the model in the failure
mode never recovers.
adversarial training can be greatly improved with the standard piecewise learning rate schedule and
early stopping.
In Figure 1 we compare fast adversarial training (solid lines) and PGD adversarial training (dash
lines) on a PreAct ResNet-18 [33] model for classifying CIFAR-10 [34]. For fast adversarial training,
we use a cyclic learning rate schedule [6], which linearly increases the learning rate to a maximum
value and then decreases until the end. In particular, we use the schedule recommended in [5], where
the learning rate linearly increases from 0 to 0.2 in the first 12 epochs and decreases to 0 for the last
18 epochs. For PGD adversarial training, we use a piecewise learning rate schedule which starts at
0.1 and decay by a factor of 0.1 at the 50th and the 75th epoch for a total of 100 epochs.
A clear gap in the robust accuracy is illustrated in Figure 1. There are two main factors accounting
for this performance gap. First, although a model trained with the cyclic learning rate can converge
in only a few epochs, it often results in sub-optimal results in the adversarial training setting [7]
compared to the piecewise learning rate schedule. The issue is that fast adversarial training is forced
to use a cyclic learning rate schedule. If a piecewise learning rate schedule is used for fast adversarial
training for a large number of epochs, the model will still encounter catastrophic overfitting. We ran
fast adversarial training with 25 different random seeds for 100 epochs, with the same piecewise
learning rate schedule for PGD adversarial training, and terminated it when catastrophic overfitting
happened. We add in Figure 1 the epoch number where the overfitting happens, versus the best clean
and robust accuracy before overfitting.
The results show that none of the training progress exceeds even the 70th epochs without encountering
catastrophic overfitting. For training progress terminated before the 50th epoch, where the learning
rate drops, their performance is inferior due to insufficient training. On the other hand, although the
rest of training progress also terminate early, they consistently outperformed fast adversarial training
with the cyclic learning rate schedule. In other words, if fast adversarial training can run for more
epochs with the piecewise learning rate schedule, it has the potential to improve upon fast adversarial
training with the cyclic learning rate schedule.
Another reason for the inferior performance of fast adversarial training is the inherent weakness of
FGSM compared to PGD attacks. As PGD is in general a better approximation to the solution for the
inner maximization problem in (1), it is expected to produce more robust models. We seek to address
this issue in Section 5.
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3.3 Understanding Fast Adversarial Training
Although [5] has shown that initialization with a large randomized perturbation results in effective
FGSM adversarial training, the underlying mechanism for its effectiveness remains a puzzle. More-
over, even with the recommended setting, catastrophic overfitting still happens on occasion. Plot
(a) in Figure 2 shows both a success mode (orange) and a failure mode (green) when we use fast
adversarial training with cyclic learning rate for 30 epochs. It seems that the model in the success
mode never encounters overfitting, while the model in the failure mode encounters catastrophic
overfitting at around the 26th epoch. However, surprisingly, if we look closer at the training progress
in plot (b), where we report the test clean and robust accuracy for every 10 batches (with a batch size
of 128) for the last 5 epochs, it is observed that the model in the success mode also encounters a
sudden drop in test robust accuracy, indicating catastrophic overfitting, but it recovers immediately.
This finding explains why fast adversarial training could run more epochs than vanilla FGSM
adversarial training. It is not because it can completely avoid catastrophic overfitting, as previously
believed; rather, it is because it can recover from the catastrophic overfitting in a few batches. This
has not been observed before because normally a model is only evaluated per epoch, while such
“overfit-and-recover” behavior happens within a span of a few batches.
The observation in Figure 2 also suggests that, when catastrophic overfitting happens, although
the model quickly transforms into a non-robust one, it is fundamentally different from an ordinary
non-robust model. In fact, the non-robust model due to catastrophic overfitting seems to be able to
quickly retain its robustness once the corresponding attack is able to avoid gradient masking and find
the correct direction for constructing attacks again.
This could explain why the randomized initialization is crucial for the success of fast adversarial
training. Fast adversarial training can leverage the randomized initialization to find the correct
direction for constructing attacks when catastrophic overfitting happens. On the other hand, it
also explains why fast adversarial training still overfits after long training progress. Randomized
initialization works with a high probability, but not always. As the training progress continues, the
model is more capable of overfitting, especially when the learning rate is small, and fast adversarial
training is less likely to find the correct direction for constructing FGSM attacks.
To verify our analysis, we conduct experiments to exclude the use of randomized initialization, that is
to use vanilla FGSM adversarial training, but also run PGD adversarial training for a few batches
when catastrophic overfitting happens. In particular, we monitor the PGD robust accuracy on a
validation set during training. Once there is a sudden drop of the validation robust accuracy, which
indicates the occurrence of overfitting, we run PGD adversarial training for a few batches to help
the model recover from overfitting, as an alternative to R+FGSM. The same piecewise learning rate
schedule as in Figure 1 is used. We also run the vanilla fast adversarial training as a reference.
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Figure 3: Validation clean and robust accuracy evaluated for every 20 batches. (a) Fast adversarial
training. (b) FGSM with no randomized initialization but using PGD to mitigate overfitting. (c)
FGSM with randomized initialization and PGD to mitigate overfitting. All training uses the same
piecewise learning rate schedule.
The results are illustrated in Figure 3. Comparing plot (a) and (b), while the fast adversarial training
overfits after around 15,000 batches, FGSM adversarial training without randomized initialization
obtains robust accuracy despite several “overfit-and-recover” behaviors. This confirms our hypothesis
that the essential nature of successful FGSM adversarial training is not the randomized initialization,
but the ability to recover from catastrophic overfitting.
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4 A Simple Fix to Fast Adversarial Training
The analysis and experimental results above suggest that (i) FGSM adversarial training is useful as
long as it can recover from catastrophic overfitting, and (ii) fast adversarial training can only run for
limited epochs because the randomized initialization is not reliable. Therefore, a more reliable way
to mitigate catastrophic overfitting is needed. To this end, we propose a simple fix to fast adversarial
training, incorporating PGD adversarial training when catastrophic overfitting is observed.
Algorithm 1 Improved fast adversarial training for T epochs, given some radius , N PGD steps,
step size α, a threshold c, frequency of detection s, and a dataset of size M for a network fθ.
for t = 1 . . . T do
for i = 1 . . .M do
if Acclast > Accvalid + c then
δ = PGD Attack(fθ, xi, yi) // Overfitting happens, run PGD adversarial training
else
δ = R+FGSM Attack(fθ, xi, yi) // No Overfitting, use R+FGSM adversarial training
end if
θ = θ −∇θ`(fθ(xi + δ), yi) // Update model weights with some optimizer, e.g. SGD
end for
if i%s == 0 then
Let Acclast = Accvalid. Update robust accuracy Accvalid under PGD attacks.
end if
end for
The proposed approach is described in Algorithm 1. The core idea is simple and has been described
briefly in the previous section: we hold out a validation set and monitor its robust accuracy for
detecting overfitting. When there is a drop on the validation robust accuracy beyond a threshold,
at which point catastrophic overfitting happens, we run 10-step PGD adversarial training for a few
batches to help the model regain its robustness.
Note that although the training progress in plot (a) of Figure 3 overfits at around the 15,000th batch,
the frequency of catastrophic overfitting is much lower compared to the training progress in plot
(b), where no randomized initialization is used. This may also imply that although randomized
initialization is not reliable for mitigating catastrophic overfitting, it reduces its occurrences. To verify
this conjecture, we perform the same experiment as in plot (b), but now with randomized initialization,
and show the training progress in plot (c) of Figure 3. The occurrences of catastrophic overfitting is
much fewer than in plot (b), confirming our conjecture. Therefore, we keep the large randomized
initialization for FGSM adversarial training in Algorithm 1, resulting in R+FGSM adversarial training.
The infrequent occurrences of catastrophic overfitting also ensures the additional PGD adversarial
training adds little computational overhead to the training progress.
Hyperparameters In Table 1 we report the final clean and robust accuracy of the improved fast
adversarial training (FastAdv+). We use the same piecewise learning rate schedule and early stopping
as used in PGD adversarial training. We detect overfitting every s = 20 batches with a randomly
sampled validation batch, and PGD adversarial training runs for s = 20 batches until the when
overfitting happens. The threshold for detecting catastrophic overfitting is c = 0.1. The robust
accuracy is evaluated against 50-step PGD attacks with 10 restarts for  = 8/255. Note we use
half-precision computations [32] as recommended in [5] for all training methods, for acceleration.
All experiments are repeated for 5 times, and both the mean and the standard deviation are reported.
Table 1: CIFAR-10 standard and robust accuracy on PreAct ResNet-18 for vanilla PGD adversarial
training with early stopping, fast adversarial training (FastAdv), improved fast adversarial training
(FastAdv+) and fast adversarial training as a warmup for PGD adversarial training (FastAdvW).
Method Standard Accuracy PGD( = 8/255) Time(min)
PGD 83.43± 0.25% 51.74± 0.17% 166.45
FastAdv 83.41± 0.13% 46.14± 0.08% 12.35
FastAdv+ 83.54± 0.22% 48.43± 0.14% 28.32
FastAdvW 83.18± 0.18% 53.09± 0.11% 40.73
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As we are able to train the model with a piecewise learning rate schedule for a large number of
epochs, both clean and robust accuracy is improved without sacrificing much efficiency. In fact, the
computational efficiency is the same for each epoch in FastAdv and FastAdv+. FastAdv consumes
less time merely because it runs for 30 epochs. Note we only report the average running time but
omit the variance since it is largely affected by early stopping.
5 Fast Adversarial Training as a Warmup
We are able to improve the performance of fast adversarial training by allowing longer training
progress. However, the associated robust accuracy is still noticeably worse than PGD adversarial
training. This is expected, as PGD is inherently a stronger attack than FGSM. In this section, we
adapt a previously studied technique [8], using FGSM adversarial training as a warmup for PGD
adversarial training, to close the gap between fast adversarial training and PGD adversarial training.
It has been observed in [8] that using FGSM at the early stage of PGD adversarial training does not
degrade its performance, and even provides slight improvement. The intuition behind this is that
at the early stage of training, the model is vulnerable to adversarial attacks, and therefore there is
no difference between using a weak attack and a strong attack. As the training proceeds, the model
becomes more robust to weak attacks, and sometimes even overfits, where stronger attacks are more
effective at increasing the robustness of the model.
However, due to the risk of overfitting, only a few epochs of FGSM adversarial training were used in
[8] as a warmup, and consequently it does not provide much improvement on the robust accuracy, nor
does it save much training time. As FastAdv+ can run for as many epochs as needed, it is possible to
use it for most of the training epochs and PGD adversarial training for only a few epochs at the end.
Starting Point of PGD Adversarial Training Since early stopping always happens a few epochs
after the learning rate decay, we starts PGD adversarial training a few epochs before the learning
rate decay, to minimize the span of PGD adversarial training for the purpose of efficiency. In the
experiments, we run the improved fast adversarial training for the first 70 epochs and change to
PGD adversarial training. The early stopping happens at the 78th epoch, meaning we only run PGD
adversarial training for no more than 10 epochs.
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Figure 4: Robust accuracy on a validation set,
evaluated for FastAdv+, PGD adversarial train-
ing, FastAdvW with a constant perturbation size
 = 8/255, and with  = 4/255 and 8/255 in
two stages.
We report in Figure 4 the validated clean and ro-
bust accuracy during the whole training progress for
FastAdv+ as a warmup, termed FastAdvW. While
using FastAdvW improves upon FastAdv+, it still
suffers from overfitting (however, not catastrophic
overfitting) in the later stage of training. We assume
this is due to the fact that the FGSM attack with a
large randomized initialization is already strong, in
contrast to vanilla FGSM adversarial training used
in [8]. Following the intuition that only a weak at-
tack is needed in the early stage, we reduce the size
of perturbation  from 8/255 to 4/255 for the stage
of fast adversarial training. As shown in Figure 4,
this change of the attack size (FastAdvW 4-8) al-
lows the model to reach higher robust accuracy. We
also report the final test clean and robust accuracy,
which is based on early stopping1, on the test set
in Table 1. This shows FastAdvW outperforms PGD adversarial training in robust accuracy and is
comparable on clean accuracy.
6 Additional Experiments
In the above analyses, we only evaluated the proposed approach on CIFAR-10 using the PreAct
ResNet-18 architecture. In this section, we run more experiments on various data sets and model
architectures to show the generality of our results.
1For FastAdvW, we only consider stopping after PGD adversarial training starts.
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We first show in Table 2 results for both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 on the Wide-ResNet 34-10 [35]
as this model structure is widely used in the adversarial training literature [3, 30, 11, 7]. The same
setting of hyperparameters in Section 4 is used, except the threshold for detecting “catastrophic
overfitting” is reduced to c = 0.05 for CIFAR-100 to accommodate for its range of robust accuracy.
In addition, we also include in Table 2 results for “free” adversarial training [30]. This approach
reduces the computational cost of PGD adversarial training utilizing the “minibatch replay” technique,
which adds adversarial perturbations and updates the model simultaneously on the same minibatch
for several iterations, to imitate PGD adversarial training. As a result, this approach only needs to
run for several epochs to converge. In this experiments, we follow the recommendation in [30] and
replay each batch m = 8 times for a total of 25 epochs.
Finally, we conduct experiments on Tiny ImageNet, with results also summarized in Table 2. Although
previous works [5, 30] conduct experiments on ImageNet, it still requires several GPUs to run. As
we only run experiments on a single RTX 2080ti, we considered Tiny ImageNet, which consists
of 200 ImageNet classes at 64 x 64 resolution. The architecture we use is ResNet-50 [36] and the
hyperparameters, such as learning rate and size of attacks, are kept the same as for CIFAR datasets.
Table 2: CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 standard and robust accuracy, and the corresponding training
time on Wide-ResNet 34-10 for PGD adversarial training, free adversarial training (Free), FastAdv,
FastAdv+ and FastAdvW. PGD attacks with 50 iterations and 10 restarts are used for evaluation.
Model Method Standard Accuracy PGD( = 8/255) Time(min)
CIFAR-10
PGD 85.27± 0.31% 54.10± 0.20% 998.27
Free (m=8) 85.87± 0.37% 46.13± 0.19% 358.53
FastAdv 85.21± 0.22% 46.36± 0.13% 82.32
FastAdv+ 86.52± 0.25% 51.01± 0.18% 143.17
FastAdvW 85.91± 0.36% 55.13± 0.22% 237.87
CIFAR-100
PGD 61.92± 0.20% 26.60± 0.14% 1014.47
Free (m=8) 62.11± 0.22% 25.37± 0.09% 362.83
FastAdv 55.71± 0.17% 27.50± 0.13% 103.83
FastAdv+ 60.57± 0.25% 28.61± 0.10% 184.50
FastAdvW 61.01± 0.27% 28.88± 0.17% 257.13
Tiny ImageNet
PGD 45.34± 0.30% 21.62± 0.11% 2099.83
Free (m=8) 34.75± 0.11% 14.30± 0.07% 743.94
FastAdv 48.31± 0.21% 19.96± 0.08% 194.51
FastAdv+ 48.02± 0.19% 20.05± 0.11% 330.65
FastAdvW 46.73± 0.31% 21.82± 0.19% 592.22
6.1 Analysis
The results in Table 2 are consistent with what we have observed on the PreAct ResNet-18 architecture
for CIFAR-10. While FastAdv+ outperforms vanilla fast adversarial training as a result of longer
training progress, its robust accuracy is no better than PGD adversarial training. However, when
we use FastAdv+ as a warmup, its clean accuracy becomes comparable to PGD adversarial training,
while its robust accuracy constantly outperforms PGD adversarial training. In addition, FastAdvW
only consumes 25% of the training time of PGD adversarial training. It is also worth noting that
although free adversarial training uses a piecewise learning rate schedule as well, it only obtains its
best performance at the end of the training progress, thus does not benefit from early stopping in both
the performance and the efficiency.
7 Conclusion
We have conducted experiments to show that the key to the success of FGSM adversarial training is
the ability to recover from “catastrophic overfitting”. Fast adversarial training utilizes randomized
initialization to achieve this goal but still suffers from catastrophic overfitting for a large number
of training epochs. We design a new training strategy that mitigates this caveat and enables the
commonly used piecewise learning rate schedule for fast adversarial training and, as a result, improves
clean and robust accuracy. We also use the improved fast adversarial training as a warmup for PGD
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adversarial training, and find it is sufficient to use this warmup for a majority of the training epochs
to save time and further improve model robustness. As a result, we are able to obtain superior
performance to the expensive, state-of-the-art PGD adversarial training with much-reduced training
time.
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A Strong Attacks after Overfitting
When FastAdv+ is used for training a model, even though the model can recover from catastrophic overfitting
via PGD adversarial training, it is possible that the model overfits to PGD attacks and stays vulnerable to other
attacks. Therefore, we extract the model right after its recovery from catastrophic overfitting and run several
kinds of attacks, including 10-step PGD attacks, 50-step PGD attacks with 10 restarts, C&W attacks [15] and
fast adaptive boundary (FAB) attacks [37], on this model.
Table 3: CIFAR-10 standard and robust accuracy on PreAct ResNet-18 under various types of
attacks.
Attacks PGD-10 PGD-50 C&W FAB
Robust Accuracy 40.22% 39.41% 41.05% 38.68%
The result shows the model recovered from catastrophic overfitting is indeed robust. Note the robust accuracy is
relatively low as we are not using the final model.
B Ablation Analysis on Adjusted Attack Size
In Section 5, we show it is possible to improve the performance of FastAdvW via using a smaller size of attacks
for FGSM adversarial training. It is possible that the adjusted size of attacks benefits not only our approach, but
also PGD adversarial training. Therefore, we use the same setting (4/255 for the first 70 epochs and 8/255 for
the rest) for full PGD adversarial training and compare it to vanilla PGD adversarial training.
Table 4: CIFAR-10 standard and robust accuracy on PreAct ResNet-18 for vanilla PGD adversarial
training and PGD adversarial training with adjusted size of attacks (4/255 and 8/255).
Method Standard Accuracy PGD( = 8/255)
PGD 83.43± 0.25% 51.74± 0.17%
PGD(adjusted size) 83.11± 0.11% 52.14± 0.28%
The results show that PGD adversarial training enjoys limited benefits from the adjusted size of attacks. This
strategy is more compatible with our proposed FastAdvW.
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